2008__02 -- FABER__FMT.DOC

1/5/2009 2:12:20 PM

UNITED HAULERS ASSOCIATION v.
ONEIDA-HERKIMER SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
JOSHUA J. FABER*

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision in United Haulers
1
Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,
upheld two counties’ flow control ordinances that require trash
haulers to deliver waste to government-owned processing facilities.2
The Court determined that the Commerce Clause3 is not violated by
laws that favor state or local government entities but treat all private
4
entities equally.
This case is a natural consequence of the Court’s decision in C &
5
A Carbone v. Clarkstown. In Carbone, the Court struck down a city’s
flow control ordinance as violating the dormant Commerce Clause
because it compelled trash haulers to use a specific private processing
facility. In Carbone, a local private contractor agreed to build a waste
processing facility at no cost to the town in return for five years of
guaranteed minimum waste flow (120,000 tons per year) through the
facility and the ability to charge above-market tipping fees6 for
processing the trash.7 To ensure that the newly-created facility would
receive the minimum waste required by the agreement, the town
enacted a flow-control ordinance, requiring any trash within the town
to be processed at this facility.8 After five years of operating the

* 2008 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United Haulers),
127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
2. Id. at 1790.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790.
5. C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
6. Tipping fees are charges to haulers when depositing waste at processing facilities.
United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1791 n.1.
7. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387 (1994).
8. Id.
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facility, the private contractor would sell the facility to the town for
9
one dollar.
United Haulers presented a very similar situation, except for one
significant difference. In 1990, two New York counties enacted
municipal ordinances requiring that all solid waste and recyclable
materials generated within the counties be processed at one of several
waste processing facilities, each of which was owned by the OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, a municipal public10
benefit corporation. The municipal corporation, like the private
contractor in Carbone, charged a higher-than-market tipping fee to
process this waste than did local privately-held waste processing
facilities.11 The Court stated that the only “salient difference” between
this case and Carbone was that the law required trash haulers to bring
their trash to a state-owned facility, instead of a privately-owned
facility.12 The Second Circuit held that even if the counties’ ordinances
burdened interstate commerce, the burden was not “clearly excessive”
13
in relation to the local benefits generated. Therefore, the ordinances
did not violate the Commerce Clause. In a case with similar facts, the
Sixth Circuit took a contrary position and held that a flow control
ordinance that favored a local government entity violated the
Commerce Clause.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this
case to resolve the circuit split.
The Court held that the municipal flow control ordinances
enacted by Oneida and Herkimer Counties did not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause, which prevents states from enacting
legislation that would impinge on interstate commerce,
15
notwithstanding congressional inaction. The majority opinion
distinguished this case, which involved a publicly-owned facility, from

9. Id.
10. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United Haulers
II), 438 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
11. The petitioners submitted evidence that the market price for disposing of the trash
would be between $37–$55 per ton, whereas the state entity was charging $86. United Haulers,
127 S. Ct. at 1792.
12. Id. at 1790.
13. United Haulers II, 438 F.3d at 160.
14. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Daviess County, 434 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he Ordinance was facially discriminatory against interstate commerce. The Ordinance, in
practical terms, is no different than other local laws struck down by the Supreme Court and this
Court as unconstitutional.”).
15. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790, 1797.
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Carbone, which involved a private entity. The Court examined the text
of its Carbone opinion and held that Carbone did not extend the
16
dormant Commerce Clause to state-owned facilities.
The Court stated that flow control ordinances that benefit a
“clearly public facility” while treating all private facilities equally “do
not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the
dormant Commerce Clause.”17 Because local governments have the
responsibility to protect the “health, safety, and welfare of [their]
citizens,”18 laws favoring such government entities should be judged
differently than laws favoring local private entities, which are often
19
enacted out of “simple economic protectionism.”
The majority provided two additional reasons why the flow
control ordinances did not violate the Commerce Clause. First, the
majority considered waste disposal historically to be a local
government function.20 Because disposing of waste is a local function,
the Court should be wary of using its Commerce Clause authority to
interfere with local government efforts. Additionally, the ordinances
are likely to lead to higher tipping fees only for those individuals who
21
voted in favor of the laws. Because the burden is not being shifted to
others who did not have the power to vote for or against the
legislation, the majority opinion insists that the Court should be
reluctant to invalidate a local government decision.22
23
24
Lastly, a plurality analyzed the local laws under the Pike test.
The Court found that the ordinances imposed little, if any, burden on
interstate commerce, which is easily overcome by the public interest
satisfied by the laws. The ordinances provide financing for the
16. See id. at 1789 (“If the Court were extending this line of local processing cases to cover
discrimination in favor of local government, one would expect it to have said so . . . Carbone
cannot be regarded as having decided the public-private question.”).
17. Id. at 1795.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1796.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1797.
22. See id. at 1789 (“There is no reason to step in and hand local businesses a victory they
could not obtain through the political process.”).
23. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer comprised the
plurality.
24. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
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counties, and they additionally offer health and environmental
benefits. The majority contended that these ordinances were passed
under the state’s police power, and the Court—analogizing to
25
Lochner v. New York —should not “rigorously scrutinize economic
legislation passed under the auspices of the police power.”26
Justice Scalia concurred in part with the Court’s decision. He
rejected the expansion of the dormant Commerce Clause and was
only willing to give stare decisis effect to the dormant Commerce
Clause in two situations: “(1) against a state law that facially
discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law
that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held
27
unconstitutional by the Court.” Because private and public entities
are not “similarly situated for Commerce Clause purposes”, unequal
treatment does not equate to discrimination.28 Lastly, Scalia rejected
the plurality opinion’s Pike balancing because he believed Congress,
rather than the Court, should engage in balancing under the
Commerce Clause.
Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment, believed that
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is incompatible with the
Constitution and should be overruled. Although he joined the Court’s
Carbone decision, he rejected this decision, writing “[t]he negative
Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution and has proved
29
unworkable in practice.” Under his view, the Constitution vests in
Congress the right to choose between the free market and economic
protectionism, and the Court cannot invalidate a state’s power to
regulate commerce without prior congressional action. Thomas
viewed the majority’s distinction between a law favoring the
government and a law favoring an in-state business as “razor thin”
and without basis.30 Lastly, he analogized the majority’s decision to
Lochner, but he insisted that Lochner’s “right of free contract” was as
dubious and unwarranted as the negative Commerce Clause, which
the Court refused to overrule as a doctrine.31
25. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1798.
27. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
28. Id. at 1799.
29. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. Id. at 1801–02.
31. See id. at 1802–03 (“[T]oday’s decision does not repudiate that doctrinal error [the
dormant Commerce Clause]. Rather, it further propagates the error by narrowing the negative
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Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with which Justices
Stevens and Kennedy joined, insisting that Carbone was
indistinguishable from this case. The dissent believed that the
counties’ flow control ordinances discriminated against interstate
commerce and thus could only be sustainable if they “serve[] a
legitimate local purpose that could not be served as well by
32
nondiscriminatory means.”
The dissent disputed the majority opinion’s conclusion that the
waste-processing facility in Carbone was indeed private. In Carbone,
the Court repeatedly referred to the facility as the “town’s” transfer
station, and the town enacted ordinances to guarantee the facility a
33
minimum income stream. In addition, the town purchased the
facility five years after operations commenced for one dollar. In
considering form over substance, the dissent insisted that the Court
understood the facility in Carbone to be a municipal facility, and thus
Carbone presents the same facts as the current case.34
Even if Carbone did not deal with a municipal facility, the dissent
maintained that strict scrutiny should apply regardless of whether
legislation discriminates in favor of a privately-owned or state-owned
35
facility. The market-participant doctrine allows states to discriminate
if they are acting solely as market participants rather than as market
36
regulators. Because the state is regulating the market by requiring all
trash to be processed in specific facilities, the dissent contended it
should not be allowed to discriminate against interstate commerce.37
Alito then attacked the majority’s justifications for its ultimate
decision. First, he insisted that “[d]iscrimination in favor of an in-state
government facility serves ‘local economic interests.’”38 He cited

Commerce Clause for policy reasons—reasons that later majorities of this Court may find to be
entirely illegitimate.”).
32. Id. at 1803 (Alito, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1804–05.
34. See id. (“The Court exalts form over substance in adopting a test that turns on this
technical distinction, particularly since . . . the transaction in Carbone could have been
restructured to provide for the passage of title at the beginning, rather than the end, of the 5year period.”).
35. See id. at 1805–06 (“The Court has long subjected discriminatory legislation to strict
scrutiny, and has never, until today, recognized an exception for discrimination in favor of a
state-owned entity.”).
36. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).
37. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1806–07 .
38. Id. at 1807 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 404).
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several examples of local economic interests served by the ordinances,
including the economic benefits to local residents employed by the
39
facility as well as the local businesses supplying the facility. The
dissent contended that the law should be subject to strict scrutiny if
the legislative means are discriminatory, irrespective of the legitimacy
of the goals. Because the goals could be achieved by
nondiscriminatory means, the ordinances would fail strict scrutiny.
Second, Alito insisted that “the Court is simply mistaken in
concluding that waste disposal is ‘typically’ a local government
function,” and cited statistics demonstrating that “most of the garbage
produced in this country is still managed by the private sector.”40
This decision ensures that the Court will continue to adhere to its
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and jurisprudence. Seven
justices41 agree that the dormant Commerce Clause applied to this
case, although they disagreed whether the Carbone precedent
dictated the decision. Though its composition has changed in recent
years, a strong majority of the Court maintains that the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting legislation that
discriminates against interstate commerce, even in the absence of
congressional legislation.
This decision does not definitively address the dissent’s
public/private concerns, which must be resolved in future Court
decisions. The majority opinion regards the Carbone decision as
controlling for legislation favoring a private facility, whereas the
United Haulers decision controls for legislation favoring a public
facility. Litigation will likely arise in the future in situations that do
not obviously fit into either category, such as if a town that owns the
facility leases it to a private entity, and subsequently passes a flow
control ordinance. Until such a case arises, the Court’s decisions in
Carbone and United Haulers provide municipalities with ample
guidance to determine whether legislation will discriminate against
interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.

39. Id. at 1807–08.
40. Id. at 1811.
41. The only two judges who wish to invalidate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
either in whole or in part, are Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 1798–1803.

